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In this paper, we examine the reaction of stock market returns and volatility in a
diverse group of six emerging markets to a set of IMF events. In particular, we test within
a panel framework whether there was an “investor panic” causing a significant drop in
stock market returns on the days of negative IMF events. We find that on average
negative (positive) IMF news reduce (increase) daily stock returns by about one
percentage point. The most influential single event is the delay of loans from the IMF,
which reduces stock returns by about one and a half percentage points. IMF news do not
have a significant impact on the volatility of stock markets. Thus, it appears that IMF
actions and events primarily have an effect on pay-offs but not on risk, and do not appear
to support the hypothesis of IMF induced “investor panics”.
JEL: F300,  G100
Keywords: IMF news, stock market returns, emerging markets1
I. Introduction
International Monetary Fund (IMF) policies during the Asian financial crisis were
severely criticized by some observers and the debate on the effectiveness of IMF policies
has intensified since the crisis (see, for instance, Katz, 1998 and Naim, 2000). Indeed,
some have argued that that the Asian crisis has, in part, resulted from a “creditor panic”
created by IMF actions. Foreign creditors panic because they realize that the domestic
banks cannot act as a lender of resort for dollar-denominated debts and therefore they try
to move their assets out of the country as fast as possible. Sachs (1999) argues that
“ … provocative IMF actions have probably contributed to the [creditor] panics” (p. 389).
During the first half of the 1990s, the developing countries of East Asia were able
to borrow substantial amounts from international banks. By mid-1997, an amount
roughly corresponding to half of the total loans consisted of short-term debts and these
significantly exceeded the level of foreign exchange reserves. In 1996, foreign creditors’
concerns about the debtor countries’ overvalued currencies, declining exports, and
overcapacity led international banks to begin to reduce their lending to the region. After
the devaluation of the Thai bath in mid-1997, these banks almost stopped lending to this
region. The IMF’s declaration that Asia needed drastic financial reforms is thought to
have led investor withdrawal from the region. According to this view, declining
confidence investor in the region was an important factor, among other things, in
initiating the crisis.  IMF statements and poor IMF advise further contributed to the crisis
(Sachs 1999).
In this paper, we examine whether IMF statements and actions had a similar
impact on investors in emerging stock markets by studying the reaction of stock markets
to a set of IMF events. We test whether there was a corresponding “investor panic” in
stock markets, causing a significant drop in market returns on the days of negative IMF2
statements and other IMF-related events and vice versa.
1  To the extent that foreign banks
and creditors affected by the Asian crisis also invest in emerging stock markets, this
would contribute to the investor panic. In addition, withdrawal of foreign loans from an
emerging market may increase the country risk in that country, affecting the local stock
market negatively, and that risk may easily spread to other emerging markets.
A finding that stock market returns decline significantly on the days of specific
negative IMF events would indicate that IMF actions undermine investor confidence in
markets, because of expected liquidity shortage in markets due to IMF statements, such
as delay of loans by IMF, and hence result in negative returns as investors sell off their
assets quickly. Further, we also analyze whether IMF news contribute to the overall
volatility of the stock markets. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we briefly
summarize previous work on this topic. Section III describes the construction of IMF
events while in section IV we report our results. The last section concludes the paper and
discusses policy implications of our findings.
II. Previous literature and our contribution
There is scant literature on the effects of IMF events on financial markets. Kho
and Stulz (1999) use an events study to examine the impact of IMF assistance on the
value of bank stocks. Their focus is on Asian markets during the financial crisis. They
conclude that the IMF program announcements increased bank shareholder wealth. In a
related study, Dong, Kho and Stulz (2000) examine the impact of the announcement
dates of IMF support programs on the abnormal returns of the U.S. banks during crises,
                                                
1 It is well known that volatility linkages among bond, money, and stock markets are highly strong. Thus
panics in emerging credit markets may easily get transmitted to stock markets in such countries. For
evidence on this issue, see Fleming et al. (1998) and the references cited therein.3
and they report similar results in that these banks tend to earn high abnormal returns.
Overall, IMF news is found to have a significant influence on returns.
Brealey and Kaplanis (2000) look at a broad sample of IMF programs, other than
those implemented during the Asian crisis, and they cover a wider range of financial
assets than those included in Kho and Stulz (1999) and Dong, Kho and Stulz (2000).
They find substantial declines in asset prices in the weeks leading up to the
announcement of the IMF programs, but there is no evidence that the announcement of
the IMF support causes any part of these wealth losses to be reversed. 
Ganapolsky and Schmukler (2001) examine the impact of the IMF agreement
announcement during the Tequila crisis in Argentina. They find the announcement had a
positive impact on stock and bond returns. They also show that the agreement
announcement played an instrumental role in reverting the dynamics of the crisis.
These four previous studies focus on a particular IMF event. For example, Kho,
Lee and Stulz (2000) investigate IMF bailout news, while Kho and Stulz (1999)
concentrate on IMF program announcements. In another study, Kaminsky and Schmukler
(1999) and Ganapolsky and Schmukler (2001) study, among other news, debtor country
agreements with international organizations, including IMF agreements. Besides IMF
assistance, Brealey and Kaplanis (2000) also cover the progress of negotiations with the
IMF by separating news into "good" and "bad" news.
2  
Our analysis differs from the previous ones in several ways. The earlier studies
focus on a particular event or some selected events. This may not capture the overall
impact of IMF actions. In this paper, we collect, categorize, and use a wide spectrum of
the available information about IMF-related actions and events that occurred during our
sample period (see next section). 4
Another common feature of the previous studies is that, except for Kaminsky and
Schmukler 1999, they use abnormal returns as the dependent variable. Instead, we
examine stock market returns, because we test the hypothesis that some IMF actions can
create dramatic negative shocks to markets, as argued by Sachs (1999), and investors
react to these by selling off their assets quickly. In other words, our focus is on the wealth
effects of IMF actions. Because a typical risk-averse investor tends to hold a portfolio of
assets from different sectors, rather than concentrating on one or a few sectors, returns are
best captured by utilizing a composite index.
A second common factor of the earlier studies is that they all focus on returns, and
they do not investigate how IMF events affect the conditional volatility of markets. But if
stock market volatility is a measure of stock market risk or uncertainty, then a multi-
country investigation of how IMF actions affect the volatility can broaden our general
understanding of the determinants of such risk and allow us to price such risk more
efficiently. Policymakers may take appropriate policy actions to reduce the risk to the
extent that IMF policies significantly affect stock market volatility. Finally, better
knowledge of the determinants of conditional second moments of asset returns is crucial
for improving our understanding of asset pricing and effective asset allocation decisions.
Thus, this paper provides evidence whether the stock market volatility is affected by IMF
actions and related events.
Finally, the previous papers use an event study whereas we use a regression
approach following Kaminsky and Schmukler (1999), who utilize both approaches.
Because we cover “all” IMF news, a regression approach is more effective and also
avoids such potential shortcomings of an event study as discussed in Kho, Lee and Stulz
(2000) and Brealey and Kaplanis (2000). We also attempt to overcome some of the
                                                                                                                                                
2 Brealey and Kaplanis (2000) also study returns on currencies and emerging bond indexes. 5
methodological shortcomings of the Kaminsky and Schmukler study, which uses an OLS
equation with pooled data. Such an estimation procedure ignores the typical finding of
time-varying volatility observed in emerging stock market returns.
3 Moreover,  Kaminsky
and Schmukler do not provide any information about the statistical validity of their
model, and they do not include a control variable to capture the general evolution of stock
markets. 
We employ a panel data model with country fixed effects and use a GARCH
model to capture the autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity inherent in financial
data. Moreover, we include returns based on the Standards & Poor stock market index as
a control variable. Finally, we provide a number of statistical tests to ensure the adequacy
of our models. 
III. Construction of IMF news
IMF news covering the interactions between the IMF and the countries searching
for help in a regional or global crisis or for reasons unique to each country were collected
from the IMF website, the Washington Post, and BBC News. The news were then
categorized according to different types of IMF actions. Because consistency is crucial
for categorization, a substantial effort was made to put similar news under the same
heading. The different categories were constructed from the basic news observations.
They are listed and described in Table 1.
After completing the categorization process, the dates for which this news was
published were matched with the dates for the daily stock return data of the
corresponding country. A dummy variable was created for each different category such
                                                
3 Bekaert and Harvey (1997) and Aggarwal et al. (1999) provide evidence that emerging market stock
returns also exhibit time-varying volatility, similar to more mature, developed markets.6
that the variable was equal to one on the day the particular news was published, and zero
otherwise.
Over and above categorizing the variables in a neutral way, it is also useful to
group IMF events into “good” and “bad” from the point of view of the respective
country. The guiding idea is that IMF news conveys information that is similar to either a
positive or negative shock to the value of stocks. There are two basic hypotheses. 
First, it could be the case that stockholders are neutral or even negative about an
IMF intervention, as the loan part of IMF programs has to be paid back later.
4 The money
to pay back the loans has to be obtained by the government either through collecting
taxes, printing money or selling bonds. The first alternative may reduce net dividends in
the country, the second alternative may generate high inflation, and the third alternative
may lead to a public sector debt problem. Because the second and third alternatives are
usually ruled out by the non-loan parts of IMF stabilization programs, it is usually by
taxation that governments pay back the loans. But it is not clear a priori that IMF loans
will have a positive impact on stock returns if investors know that they have to pay back
the money later. 
Second, one can argue that a supportive IMF intervention will, in general, be
beneficial to the country in question and to equity holders. We subscribe to this view,
because countries asking for help are often liquidity constrained, but their assets still
outweigh their liabilities. The cash inflow from IMF loans keeps the system working until
liquidity has been restored, enabling the economy to keep going by itself. A similar view
is suggested by Sachs (1999) who emphasizes the liquidity crisis as a major factor for the
worsening of the Asian crisis as foreign investors withdrew their assets due to a financial
                                                
4 To our knowledge, so far every IMF credit has been paid back to involved countries, usually with market
interest rates. 7
panic. Thus, by injecting liquidity into the markets, IMF actions can positively influence
market returns. On the other hand, a delay of loans by the IMF may signal future liquidity
constraints, thus causing a decline in market returns today. It may also represent an
unfavorable external evaluation of a country’s macroeconomic policies. Further, the IMF
is usually market-oriented, and the loan part of programs always comes with obligations
to de-regulate the economy, which, on average, is good for business.
IV. Data and econometric methodology
The analysis is based on daily closing stock returns for six countries, Indonesia,
South Korea, Argentina, Brazil, Pakistan, and Russia over the time period 1 July 1997 to
31 December 1999. The data for the closing stock prices were obtained from the Yahoo
finance website, http://finance.yahoo.com/m2. Countries are chosen to represent different
regional groups. The first two countries were hit by the Asian financial crisis countries
while the next two were affected by the crisis in South America. The last one belongs to a
diverse group of other countries whose crises were more sui generis. Composite stock
returns (Returns) are computed by taking the first differences of logged daily stock price
indices and multiplying by 100.  As a control variable and to capture the impact of
general market developments, we also include the Standard & Poors Stock Price Index
daily returns in our estimations. 
Descriptive statistics for both variables can be found in Table 2. The mean return
is about four times as high in the U.S. as it is in the emerging countries over our sample
period, while the standard deviation is less than half as big. The returns series exhibits
excess kurtosis but almost no skewness.  Excess kurtosis signals a typical problem with
financial data, namely that the series do not conform to a normal distribution. Another
problem is that time periods with high volatility are followed by periods of low volatility,8
which is also called volatility clustering. The existence of volatility clustering implies
that classical methods of estimation are not efficient. In the literature, a class of statistical
models has been developed that helps to address this situation, namely ARCH models
(Engle, 1982). We employ a more general specification based on Bollerslev (1986),
called GARCH, to cope with volatility clustering. 
Daily data on the six countries were combined into one panel data set. We then
specify a GARCH-model with country fixed effects. A model that works well for our
sample with regard to eliminating ARCH effects is the following GARCH (1,1) model
with student-t distributed residuals (see Bollerslev, 1987):
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with: α, β, δ, γ parameters, φ a vector of parameters, Dummies is a matrix containing
country and IMF news dummies, and εt|Γt-1= t[ν]; with Γt-1 capturing all information up
to t-1 and t[ν]a t-distribution with ν degrees of freedom. 
The use of a panel framework is necessary as otherwise it would not be possible
to obtain enough relevant data points for IMF news. In particular, the aggregation of IMF
events in the panel allows us not only to test for the effects of good versus bad IMF news
but also to analyze the more detailed categorization outlined above. In the next section,
we commence the analysis by studying the effects of good versus bad IMF-related news. 
V. Analyzing the effect of IMF news on stock returns
Our benchmark model initially included five lags of the dependent variable, the
same number of lags for the Standard & Poors’ returns, and country dummies. It has been
estimated as a GARCH (1,1) model with student-t distributed residuals using quasi-9
maximum likelihood techniques over the time period 1 July 1997 to 31 December 1999.
Then, reducing the number of variables in a consistent testing-down process (Chi
2(10) =
7.9), we have arrived at a more parsimonious model (Model 1) given in Table 3. We find
that all parameters of the GARCH(1,1) are significant. A sufficient condition for the
conditional variance ht to be non-negative is that α0, α1, and β1 are non-negative, which is
fulfilled here. Moreover, the sum of α1 and β1 is below unity, ruling out that the model is
an integrated GARCH (see Nelson, 1990).
5 The estimate of the student-t points towards a
distribution with four degrees of freedom, which has fatter tails than a normal
distribution. The diagnostics tests for Model 1 indicate that there is neither any trace of
ARCH left nor is the Portmanteau-type test for autocorrelation (for 60 lags) significant.
The only problem is non-normality of the residuals. However, a non-parametric estimate
of the residual density indicates that it is uni-modal and symmetric around zero, and
therefore testing should not be too adversely affected. Moreover, we use robust standard
errors based on Bollerslev and Wooldridge (1992) in Table 2. In any case, for most
variables both types of standard errors are quite similar. 
We also find that both lags of the dependent variable as well as Standard & Poors’
returns matter. Judging from the country dummies, only Indonesia shows a significant,
below average performance of its stock market. With regard to our variables of interest,
we find significant coefficient estimates for both positive and negative IMF events. In
line with our expectations, positive (negative) news have a positive (negative) effect on
returns. The size of the estimates suggests that there is some asymmetry, namely that
negative IMF news have a larger absolute impact than do positive ones. Testing the
absolute size of the coefficient for equality, however, reveals that the data does not reject
                                                
5 Estimates of ARFIMA models show no evidence of fractional integration (results omitted). Thus, the
model is both strictly stationary as well as covariance stationary. 10
such a hypothesis (Chi
2(1) = 1.77). Thus, we conclude that IMF news effects are
symmetric. 
Given that the size of the coefficients for both and good news is close to 1, one
may conjecture that the economic significance of these news on returns is very similar (1
percent) on stock returns. Testing the coefficient for good news against the hypothesis
that it is equal to one, we are unable reject the hypothesis at a 5% but 10% level (Chi
2(1)
= 3.3). In the case of bad news, we cannot reject that the coefficient is equal to unity in
absolute terms (Chi
2(1) = 0.66), and neither do we have to reject the hypothesis when
testing the hypotheses jointly (Chi
2(2) = 3.96). This is not necessarily the result of a weak
testing procedure, as testing the joint hypotheses that both news coefficients are equal to
zero in absolute terms can be easily rejected (Chi
2(2) = 8.78*). Although there remain
some indications that negative shocks tend to have an absolutely greater effect, based on
the statistical tests, we conclude that the data is consistent with a statement that positive
(negative) IMF news on average increase (decrease) stock returns by about one
percentage point.
Next, we replace the simple dichotomy good versus bad IMF news with a detailed
classification of IMF-related news items. These categories include signed agreements,
delay of loans or talks between the countries and the IMF, IMF supportive
announcements, loan approvals, request of funds, talks/negotiations, resume of
negotiations, visits, anti-IMF government policies, and favorable and unfavorable IMF
statements about the countries’ economic performance. The detailed explanation of these
categories is given in Table 1.   
Again we start with the general model outlined above and remove all insignificant
variables that are of no particular interest for this study in a testing-down process11
(Chi
2(10) = 8.19), and the outcome is Model 2 in Table 3. With regard to diagnostics,
everything said for Model 1 carries over to Model 2. 
The impacts of different news categories turn out to be insignificant except for
“delay in loans”. We cannot reject (Chi
2(10) = 11.2) the hypothesis that all IMF news
items have a zero coefficient apart from “delays”. Because we cannot reject the
hypothesis that the impact of delay news is 1.5 (Chi
2(1) = 0.005), we conclude that an
announcement of a delay in loans on average reduces stock returns by about one and a
half percentage points. 
6 
Finally, there is the question whether IMF news have an impact on the volatility
of stock markets. Or, more technically, whether news enters the variance equation
significantly (see Bollerslev and Ghyssels, 1996).
7 We constructed two aggregate news
categories. First is based on the categories good and bad news, and the second one on the
other items displayed in Table 1. Table 4 lists the estimation results, the diagnostics of
which are very similar to those in Table 3. 
We find that the first news aggregate, based on good and bad news events, which
were included in Model 4, does not enter the variance equation significantly. The same
conclusion is true for the news variable computed using all available IMF news
categories, displayed in Model 4. In addition, relaxing the restriction that all news items
contribute to the same extent to volatility does not yield any significant parameter
estimates (results omitted). 
                                                
6 This finding seems paradoxical in light of our results for the simple good and bad news category. An
obvious explanation for such finding is that good news and bad news, when disaggregated into different
categories, comes in clumps. In other words, a whole number of different good things happen within a
week or two, affecting our estimation results significantly.
7 As another robustness check, we also considered modeling within an EGARCH framework (Nelson,
1991). However, for our sample, estimating an EGARCH with a non-normal distribution did not lead to
converging estimates. The EGARCH with normal distribution turned out to be inferior to the model in
Table 4 with regard to log likelihood value and Akaike information criterion. In any case, point estimates
were of similar magnitude. 12
Moreover, neither the statistical nor the economic significance of IMF events on
stock returns is affected by including the news variables into the variance equation. To
summarize, in our framework, IMF news do not significantly contribute to stock market
volatility. 
VI. Policy Implications and Conclusions
We have analyzed the impact of IMF-related events on six emerging stock market
returns over the period of recent financial crises and IMF bailouts. During such difficult
times, IMF can be viewed as a lender of last resort and investors trading in these markets
form their actions based on their anticipation of the actions of the IMF in the near future.
Our hypothesis was that these expectations are directly reflected in stock market returns
as investors trade securities based on their expectations about the outcome of future IMF
events. To test this hypothesis, we have constructed a panel data set covering six
emerging markets and found that good and bad news have a statistically significant effect
on stock market returns. This finding suggests that IMF actions have important wealth
effects for investors. On average, bad (good) IMF news decrease (increase) stock returns
by one percentage point. These results are consistent with earlier studies that also report
significant effects of IMF announcements on asset returns. 
Among the different categories of the IMF actions, we have found that markets
react only to delays in making loans or talks, suggesting that “liquidity concerns” have
played a very significant role in emerging markets during financial crises. As a rule of
thump, delays in loans reduce stock market returns by about one and a half percentage
points.
This finding is only partially consistent with Sachs (1999) who stresses the
importance of the liquidity crisis during the Asian crisis as foreign short-term credit was13
withdrawn due to the creditor panic. We do find that returns go down as a result of
negative IMF news. But since the absolute effect of IMF news is relatively modest
compared to the overall variation of returns in the data (in our sample, returns fluctuate
between –26.6 and + 28.8 percent), we do not find support for the hypothesis of IMF
induced “investor panics”. Further, we did not find strong evidence that IMF news
increase market volatility. Hence, although IMF news has wealth effects, they do not
appear to contribute significantly to overall market uncertainty. Based on these results,
we would argue that IMF actions and events primarily have an effect on pay-offs but not
on risk. 
8
With regard to policy conclusions, we would recommend that the IMF attempts to
be particularly sensitive about its announcements and actions. If stock market wealth
effects play an important role in the current economic situation of a country, then delays
in processing loans should be avoided. This really amounts to a rather passive role of the
IMF in the sense that it has to be aware of the consequences of its decisions. With respect
to this aspect, it is not obvious whether the IMF needs a special reminder. 
One can also imagine a more active role of IMF news in shaping stock market
returns. Assuming super-exogeneity of the estimated parameters (see Engle et al., 1983),
the IMF can in principle exploit its position to manipulate stock market returns in both
directions. We are not very favorable with regard to this alternative. 
First, based on our estimates, the IMF is not able to dramatically alter market
returns or volatility. Moreover, it is not clear whether super-exogeneity is a reasonable
                                                
8 We have recently received a paper by Peter Tilmann (2001) who test the hypothesis of moral hazard
induced by IMF crisis lending. Under moral hazard argument, the relationship between risk and return
weakens during a crisis. Using daily bond market data, Tilmann shows that IMF lending does not lead to
IMF induced moral hazard problem, but he finds that such IMF actions assist investors to calculate the
riskiness of their assets carefully. Our result that IMF news did not have much impact on stock market
volatility, which is a proxy for risk, complements Tilmann’s findings.14
assumption, and further research would be necessary to establish such a result. Thus, in
view of the relatively modest absolute effects of IMF actions compared to the movements
of returns during crises, and doubts about its ability to exploit its influence on market
returns, we cannot recommend using IMF news actively to affect stock market returns.  15
References
Aggarwal, R., C. Inclan, and R. Leal (1999), “Volatility in Emerging Stock Markets.”
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 34, 33-35.
Bekaert, G. and C.R. Harvey (1997), “Emerging Market Volatility.” Journal of Financial
Economics 43, 29-77. 
Brealey, R.A. and E.C. Kaplanis (2000), “The Impact of the IMF Programs on Asset
Values”, Working Paper, London Business School, July. 
Bollerslev, T. (1986), “Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity”,
Journal of Econometrics 31, 307-327. 
Bollerslev, T. (1987), “A Conditional Heteroscedastic Model for Speculative Prices and
Rates of Return”, Review of Economics and Statistics 69, 542-547
Bollerslev, T. and G. Ghysels (1996), “Periodic Autoregressive Heteroscedasticity”,
Journal of Business and Economics Statistics 14, 139-151. 
Bollerslev, T. and J.M. Wooldridge (1992) “Quasi-Maximum Likelihood Estimation and
Inference in Dynamic Models with Time Varying Covariances,” Econometric
Reviews 11, 143–172.
Dong, L., B.C. Kho and R. Stulz (2000), “US Banks, Crises and Bailouts: From Mexico
to LTCM”, American Economic Review 90, 28-37. 
Engle, R. (1982), “Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity with Estimates of the
Variance of United Kingdom Inflation”, Econometrica 50, 987-1008. 
Engle, R.F., D.F. Hendry, and J. F. Richard (1983), “Exogeneity”, Econometrica, 51,
277-304.
Fleming, J., C. Kirby, and B. Ostdiek (1998), “Information and Volatility Linkages in the
Stock, Bond, and Money Markets”, Journal of Financial Economics, 49, 111-37.16
Ganapolsky, E. and S. L. Schmukler (2001), “ Crisis Management in Argentina during 
The 1994-95 Mexican Crisis: How Did Markets React?” World Bank
Economists’ Forum, 1, 3-30.
Kaminsky, G. L. and S. L. Schmukler (1999), “What Triggers Market Jitters?: A
Chronicle of the Asian Crisis”, Journal of International Money and Finance 18,
1999, 501-514.
Katz, S.S. (1998), “The Asian Crisis, the IMF and the Critics,” Eastern Economic
Journal 25, 421-439.
Kho, B.C and R. Stulz (1999), “Banks, the IMF and the Asian Crisis”, Working Paper,
Ohio State University, August. 
Naim, M. (2000), “Washington Consensus or Washington Confusion?” Foreign Policy
118, 87-103.
Nelson, D. (1990), Stationarity and Persistence in the GARCH(1,1) model, Econometric
Theory 6, 318-334. 
Nelson, D. (1991), Conditional Heteroscedasticity in Asset Pricing: A New Approach,
Econometrica 59, 347-370. 
Sachs, J. (1999), “Creditor Panics: Causes and Remedies”, Cato Journal 18, 377-390,
Winter. 
Tillmann, P. (2001), “Switching Risk-Perception on Bond Markets; Does IMF Lending
Induce Moral Hazard?” Working Paper, University of Cologne, Germany.17
Table 1: Defining IMF news categories
Category Definition No. of cases
Agreements Signing of agreements to implement a new economic
program over a period of time.
9
Delays Delay of loans or talks between the countries and the
IMF as a result of disagreements between the
counter-parties on issues such as the reforms that
should be made, or the conditions that must be




Positive statements made by the countries’
government officials towards IMF policies or
announcements of economic program that favor IMF
policies or necessary to be eligible for new loans.
23
Loan Approval Credits and loans extended by the IMF to the member
countries with payment problems through stand-by
arrangements, extended fund facility, reserve tranche






Request of loans, including "bail-out" loans. Such
requests usually come from the president of the
country, usually in a situation of financial or
economical crisis, in search of support funds to make




Negotiations that take place between a country and






Government announced policies and statements that
do not comply with or support IMF policies.
718
Resumptions This captures the resume of the negotiations between
a country and the IMF following a period of delay of
loans or talks.
5
Visits Each year a team of four or five IMF staff members
travels to the capitals of the countries that it is
helping and spend some time gathering information
and holding discussions with government officials
about the countries’ economic policies. Statements,





Statements made by the IMF officials praising the
reform measures taken by the countries, the





Statements made by the IMF officials usually for the
countries that did not fulfill or that did not put
enough effort to satisfy the restrictive conditions
brought by an agreement or a loan approval.
10
Bad news Combines the above categories “delays” and
“unfavorable statements”, and partially “talks”.
17
Good news Combines the above categories “agreements”, “loan
approval”, “resumptions”, “visits”, “favorable
statements”, and partially “talks”.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Returns and S&P
Mean St.Dev. Minimum Maximum Skewness Excess kurtosis
Returns 0.02 3.33 -26.6 28.8 -0.09 8.7
S&P 0.08 1.24 -7.1 5.0 -0.48 4.120
Table 3: Explaining stock returns using a GARCH (1,1) model with t-student distribution
Model 1 Model 2
Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
α0 0.35** 0.09 0.35 0.09
α1 0.22** 0.03 0.22 0.03
β1 0.78** 0.03 0.78 0.03
Student-t degrees of freedom (ν) 4.33 4.31
Returnst-1 0.06** 0.02 0.06** 0.02
Returnst-4 -0.05** 0.02 -0.05** 0.02
S&Pt 0.41** 0.04 0.41** 0.04
S&Pt-1 0.19** 0.03 0.19** 0.03
S&Pt-4 0.08* 0.03 0.08* 0.03
S&Pt-5 0.08* 0.03 0.08* 0.03
Indonesia -0.15* 0.08 -0.16* 0.08
Positive IMF news 0.54* 0.27
Negative IMF news -1.64** 0.66
Favorable IMF statement 0.93 0.65
Request from the IMF -0.13 1.48
IMF-supportive announcement by gov. 0.65 0.38
Loan approval 0.46 0.33
Visit by IMF delegation -0.05 0.82
Unfavorable statement by the IMF -1.47 1.05
Agreement 0.64 0.52
Talks or Negotiations  0.26 0.67
Anti-IMF announcements by governm. -1.34 1.37
Delay of loans or talks -1.42** 0.47
Resumption of loans 1.41 2.12
Number of observations 3497 3497
Log-likelihood -8272.4 -8240.4
Normality test Chi
2(2) = 2315** Chi
2(2) = 2277**
ARCH 1-2 test F(2, 3480) = 0.53 F(2, 3471) = 0.54
Portmanteau (60) test Chi
2(58) = 74.5 Chi
2(58) = 74.9
Notes: * (**) indicates significance at a 5% (1%) level. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity-consistent.21
Table 4: Explaining stock returns with IMF news in the variance equation
Model 3 Model 4
Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
α0 0.34** 0.09 0.35** 0.10
α1 0.23** 0.03 0.23** 0.04
β1 0.77** 0.03 0.77** 0.04
Student-t degrees of freedom (ν) 4.32 4.31
Returnst-1 0.06** 0.02 0.06** 0.02
Returnst-4 -0.05** 0.02 -0.05** 0.02
S&Pt 0.41** 0.04 0.41** 0.04
S&Pt-1 0.19** 0.03 0.20** 0.03
S&Pt-4 0.08* 0.03 0.08* 0.03
S&Pt-5 0.07* 0.03 0.07* 0.03
Indonesia -0.15* 0.08 -0.13 0.08
Positive IMF news 0.54* 0.26
Negative IMF news -1.63* 0.65
Delay of loans or talks -1.54** 0.50
IMF News aggregate based on good
and bad in variance equation
0.96 0.93
IMF News aggregate based on all items
in variance equation 0.92 0.83
Number of observations 3497 3497
Log-likelihood -8271.6 -8275
Normality test Chi
2(2) = 2336** Chi
2(2) = 2380**
ARCH 1-2 test F(2, 3479) = 0.54 F(2, 3480) = 0.52
Portmanteau (60) test Chi
2(58) = 73.4 Chi
2(58) = 73.4
Notes: * (**) indicates significance at a 5% (1%) level. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity-consistent.2008
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